Is Google the world’s biggest data broker?
As the US vs Google ad tech trial unfolds, Chalice’s Adam Heimlich explores how Google used data to dominate display advertising, manipulate auctions, and crush competition. Discover the hidden tactics behind its market power and what it means for the future of digital advertising.
Since a broker is an intermediary, and the basis of audience targeting is data, there should be no doubt Google is an enormous data broker — maybe the biggest of all time. That’s the big takeaway from Week 1 of US vs Google, the ad tech case currently in session in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Google’s Doubleclick & Admeld Takeover
Instead of selling consumer data to ad tech companies, Google opted to dedicate its brokerage to the service of Google advertisers. By 2007, these were demanding more cheap clicks than Google search could drive.
In glaring contrast with what an honest broker would do, Google decided to acquire Doubleclick and Admeld, assume the role of a trusted sell-side broker helping publishers monetize, and then use buy-side data against those publishers.
Cream Skimming and Auction Manipulation
Google monopolized the market for intermediary auction software by replacing fair and open auctions with auctions manipulated through Google’s secret use case for consumer data: cream skimming.
It’s relatively easy to predict conversions if you know what nearly everybody has been searching for online lately. But Google wasn’t satisfied with simply bidding to place, say, Proactiv ads in front of people they knew were worried about pimples. Google felt it necessary to place relevant ads without ever paying above market rate on behalf of Proactiv or any other advertiser. Overbidding is a natural consequence of winning a lot of auctions, which is why sellers like them. There’s no way to know what bid price you have to beat to win. Usually!
Secret Projects: Bernanke, Jedi, and Poirot
Acting as a dishonest broker with unique auction privileges, Google implemented a series of secret tactics to place ads in front of future purchasers for prices lower — sometimes much lower — than those placements were worth.
These include First Look, Last Look, Project Bernanke, Project Jedi, and Project Poirot. (It says a lot that only the DOJ was able to uncover these conducts, despite intense publisher scrutiny and dozens if not hundreds of ex-Google employees knowing about them. The amount of power required to keep a secret so big for so many years is immense.) Though auction manipulation is rightly the focus of the federal case, advertising professionals should note it’s data that drove the outsize profits Google reaped from digital display.
Data Power vs. Market Power
There’s nothing illegal about having the most data or using it to win continuously in search. There’s also nothing illegal about selling data, though reputable data brokerages somehow came to be regarded as less ethical than Google (I wonder how that happened). Where Google crossed a line was in exporting its data advantage from search to display.
Cream skimming radically altered what had been thriving competitions for buy- and sell-side ad tech. US law looks askance at market winners crossing into adjacent markets for an excellent reason: success in this sort of “monopoly maintenance” closes off markets from what they need to grow properly. Without a route to success through competition, markets see less investment, a slower pace of innovation, and lower value at every price. This is what happened to display.
The Downfall of Display Advertising
The trial includes a great deal of evidence on CPMs: which way they changed, at which times, and by how much. We who worked in digital display over the last decade can recall what we saw: deteriorating quality, persistent fraud, opacity on fees even when transparency was promised, constant reputational and corporate risk, and routine non-disclosure of even the basic facts about what we purchased or sold. There has been a great deal of finger-pointing at allegedly bad actors, though not enough at the biggest one. Finally, we can be grateful to have reached a moment of accountability, and an opportunity to reset.
A Market in Need of a Reset
Google thrived while the market suffered because it used its data advantage to cherry-pick display opportunities of high value to search advertisers. Besides lowering the overall value of display and rewarding corrupt players, Google’s bias tilted the display market toward direct response advertising, which values last actions over persuasion and sentiment lift. This has been extremely costly to brands, whose use cases for advertising were simply not served by the dominant technology. Also victimized were quality publishers, as monetization was (and still is) determined almost entirely by decision algorithms that ignore quality signals such as ad-to-content ratio, refresh rate, and share of returning readers. No one knows as well as we do what drove the devolution of news toward clickbait.
If Google’s data had been left within its search walled garden or brought to an open market for display advertising, that market would not nearly be so ruined. Google’s case unravels if you doubt that winning an arms race in data should grant a company the right to dominate in AI. If the data world champions hoard what they know about us, and only use it to fuel their own predictions, they will kill competition in many markets. It will be better for America if the world’s biggest data collectors, with their detailed digital dossiers on us all, are forced to be honest brokers.